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Abstract 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of the corporate choice between 
different forms of debt financing. By analyzing the most comprehensive sample of U.S. 
corporate debt issues to date, I find that firms that issue 144A debt have significantly lower 
credit quality and higher information asymmetry than firms that issue traditional non-bank 
private debt. Further, the study shows that traditional private placements, rather than bank loans, 
are the favorite private debt source for firms with good credit quality. I also show that the firm 
characteristics of traditional private debt issuers have significantly changed after 1990 through to 
2003.  My results suggest the following pecking order of debt choices which is conditional on 
credit quality. High credit quality firms prefer public bond offerings and small firms, with good 
credit quality, are more likely to issue traditional private debt. A large group of firms 
characterized by moderate credit quality make extensive use of bank loans and poor credit 
quality firms preferentially issue 144A debt. 
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The Corporate Choice between Public Debt, Bank Loans, Traditional Private Debt 
Placements, and 144A Debt Issues 
 
1. Introduction 
Debt is the major source of capital for U.S. firms.  In 2003 the aggregate amount of 
equity issued by U.S. firms was $106 billion while the aggregate amount of debt issued was $1.6 
trillion, about fifteen times larger.  Even after removing debt issues used to refinance old debt by 
assuming a new issue growth rate of five percent as suggested by Henderson et al. (2006), the 
amount of new debt issued in 2003 was approximately $460 billion.1  
Moreover, in contrast to the equity market, the private debt market dominates the public 
debt market in size.  Of the $106 billion of equity issued in 2003, only $19 billion was private 
(18%).  Alternatively, of the $1.6 trillion of corporate debt issued in the same year, $1.1 trillion 
was private (69%).   Within the private debt market firms can choose among different 
alternatives, such as bank loans, traditional private placements, and 144A issues.2 
This study presents a thorough examination of the determinants of the firm choice 
between all these different types of private debt and public debt by making use of the most 
comprehensive sample of U.S. corporate debt issues to date.  Throughout this analysis I present 
novel evidence that challenges the conventional view of non-bank traditional private placements 
as the source of funds for poor credit quality firms (e.g., Denis and Mihov (2003)). 
Before the introduction of 144A debt in 1990, firms often placed high-yield private debt 
securities to a limited group of institutional investors, usually insurance companies, with an 
                                                 
1 Results presented in previous studies confirm the predominance of debt over equity as source of capital for U.S. 
firms. For instance, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) report that the aggregate value of public debt issues in U.S. was 
$651 billion in 1996 and $1 trillion in 1998 while the value of new equity issues was $122 billion in 1996 and $126 
billion in 1998. 
2 This study refers to Rule 506 and regulation D private placements as traditional private placements.  I report a 
description of non-bank private debt characteristics in Section 2.1. 
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agreement to register the securities promptly and make them tradable (Johnson (1991)).  
However, the beginning of the 1990s experienced a drastic reduction of below-investment-grade 
private issues.  This contraction in the availability of credit in the private debt market was due to 
a growing reluctance of insurance companies to invest in high-risk debt securities in a period 
when low-asset quality, a change in regulatory requirements, and runs on a few insurers raised 
concerns about the solvency of insurance companies (Carey et al. (1993)).  Since the 144A debt 
market can be easily used to issue speculative-grade debt that can be subsequently registered 
(Fenn (2000)), 144A bonds might have replaced traditional private placements of low-quality, 
high-risk debt. 
The results of this study show that firms which preferentially issue 144A debt are 
significantly different from firms that privately place debt securities without using the 144A rule.  
Firms that issue 144A debt are characterized by lower credit quality and higher information 
asymmetry than firms that issue traditional non-bank private debt.  In addition, I show that firms 
issuing traditional private placements after the introduction of the 144A rule (i.e., after 1990) 
have significantly higher credit quality than firms issuing traditional private placements before 
the introduction of the 144A rule.  Overall, the results of this study provide suggestive evidence 
that 144A debt might have replaced traditional private placements of high-risk debt after the 
credit crunch in the traditional private debt market for speculative-grade debt at the beginning of 
the 1990s. 
Another main finding of the paper is that bank loans are not the preferred private debt 
source for good credit quality firms.  I find that firms with good credit quality that do not access 
the public market mainly because of flotation costs and information asymmetry are more likely 
to use traditional private placements rather than bank loans.  This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that traditional private debt investors might be willing to commit their capital only to 
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high credit quality firms with low risk of default since they cannot freely trade the debt securities 
for at least one year from the purchasing date, and in many cases they lend personal funds to the 
borrowing firm.  An additional explanation for the difference in credit quality between bank 
borrowers and non-bank traditional private debt issuers is related to the ability of bank debt to 
potentially mitigate costs of information asymmetry better than traditional private debt. Banks 
tend to maintain long-term relationships with borrowing firms and accumulate soft information 
about these firms (Fama (1985), Diamond (1991)).  Banks are also able to quickly renegotiate 
loans and therefore could have superior ability to contain financial losses in case of borrowers’ 
financial distress than non-bank traditional private lenders. 
Overall, the results of this study suggest the existence of a pecking order of debt choices 
conditional on credit quality which presents important differences from the one reported by 
Denis and Mihov (2003) who find that high credit quality firms are more likely to issue public 
debt while low credit quality firms preferentially issue non-bank private debt (traditional private 
debt along with 144A debt).  High credit quality firms prefer public bond offerings, good credit 
quality firms that are not large enough to overcome the barrier created by flotation costs are more 
likely to raise capital through traditional private debt offerings, a large group of firms 
characterized by moderate credit quality make extensive use of bank loans, and poor credit 
quality firms preferentially issue 144A debt. 
As in Denis and Mihov (2003), I analyze the incremental debt issue decision.  This 
approach has several advantages.  First, the incremental approach links the borrowing decision of 
the firm with variables measured just prior to the borrowing decision allowing the analysis of the 
effect of time-variation in firm characteristics on the debt choice.  Second, the logistic analysis 
that derives from this approach mimics the incremental managerial decisional process in the 
context of capital structure decisions allowing a better assessment of the factors that influence 
the corporate debt choice.  Finally, the analysis of incremental debt offerings does not require the 
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assumption that the firm is observed at its optimal debt mix at all times, and it provides 
meaningful results even when the incremental debt decision represents a deviation from the 
optimal mix of debt claims.  On the other hand, this method is not the most appropriate for 
testing theories that analyze the optimal debt mix in relation to the asset mix of the firm, and 
should be regarded as a complement to studies on the optimal mix of debt claims which examine 
leverage instead of incremental debt choices. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the hypotheses and describes the 
institutional characteristics of non-bank private placements.  Section 3 describes the variables of 
interest and the sample construction process.  Section 4 provides descriptive statistics and 
univariate tests.  Section 5 examines the firm’s choice between different types of debt in a 
multivariate setting.  Section 6 presents additional tests including a robustness check. Section 7 
concludes with a summary and a discussion of the results. 
 
2.  The choice between private and public debt 
2.1  Characteristics of non-bank private placements and the evolution of the private debt 
placement market 
Traditional private placements of debt securities are conducted pursuant to Section 4(2) of 
the 1933 Securities Act or to Rule 506 of regulation D.  Under these rules, firms can issue an 
unlimited amount of securities to an unlimited number of accredited investors and up to 35 
sophisticated investors.3  Firms typically place debt privately with high net worth individual 
investors, private investment firms, insurance companies, and banks.    Even though insurance 
companies are important players in the traditional private placement market, they are not as 
                                                 
3 Accredited investors are investors with net worth of at least $2,500,000 or income of at least $250,000.  
Sophisticated investors are investors whom a company reasonably believes have adequate knowledge and 
experience in financial and business matters to evaluate the securities offered for sale. 
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dominant as they were before the private debt market credit crunch that took place at the 
beginning of the 1990s (Carey et al. (1993)).  The broker who brings issuer and investors 
together is the placement agent.  Placement agents are usually underwriting arms of universal 
banks or private investment firms.  Private offerings are conducted on a best efforts, rather than 
on a firm commitment basis.  The investors receive restricted securities, which cannot be sold for 
at least a year.4 
Another form of private debt available to firms is 144A debt.  The SEC introduced Rule 
144A in 1990 to promote greater foreign participation in the U.S. debt market (Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand (2004)).   In contrast to traditional private placements, 144A placements can be freely 
traded among qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) without any holding period.5  The SEC lifted 
resale restrictions with the belief that QIBs are able to independently obtain and process 
information about 144A securities.  Another unique characteristic of the 144A market is that 
144A debt can be registered after 60 days from the issuance to be publicly traded among 
individual investors.  As indicated by Fenn (2000), this rule unexpectedly encouraged U.S. high-
yield issuers to participate in the private debt market.  Since 144A placements can be 
subsequently registered, firms that issue this kind of debt can combine the rapid issuance of 
private debt with the eventual liquidity of public debt.  The ability to issue debt quickly through 
the Rule 144A market has eased issuance procedures for junk-rated firms.  Most speculative-
rated firms do not meet the SEC requirements for shelf registration.  The 144A rule provides 
similar benefits to the shelf registration 415 rule without its strict requirements. High-yield 
                                                 
4 The holding period was two years until February 1997. 
5 The following institutions qualify as QIBs. Institutions such as insurance firms or pension plans that own or invest 
at least $100 million in securities of nonaffiliates; banks or savings and loan (S&L) associations that have audited 
net worth of at least $25 million; brokers or dealers registered under the Exchange Act, acting for their own account 
or for that of QIBs that own and invest at least $10 million in securities of nonaffiliates; and entities whose equity 
holders are all QIBs. 
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issuers make use of the 144A rule to avoid lengthy registration requirements and subsequently 
register the issue making it similar to a public security.   
 
 
2.2  Debt choice determinants and empirical questions 
Firms that issue public debt face significant fixed costs which consist of registration, 
legal, trustee’s and accountants’ fees.  Thus, small debt offerings are less likely to be public than 
large offerings.   Small firms, which issue smaller quantity of debt, are less likely to issue public 
debt than large firms (Blackwell and Kidwell (1988), and Carey et al. (1993)). 
Information asymmetry also affects a firm’s debt choice. Creditors who cannot fully 
monitor the firm’s activities require a higher yield to compensate for the risk associated with the 
moral hazard of asset substitution (Leland and Pyle (1977)).  Firms with lower information 
asymmetry are less likely to substitute at bondholders’ expense, and thus benefit from a lower 
cost of debt.  Firms with higher information asymmetry can partially reduce the cost of debt by 
issuing debt privately (Krishnaswami et al. (1999)). 
Problems associated with adverse selection are relevant for firms with high growth 
opportunities since these firms can more easily substitute low–risk projects with riskier ones 
(Myers (1977)).  The monitoring provided by lending financial institutions reduces these 
problems.  Firms that have proprietary, firm-specific information (usually positive private 
information on future cash flows) are characterized by higher information asymmetry and prefer 
to issue private debt so as to minimize the cost associated with adverse selection (Yosha (1995), 
and Hadlock and James (2002)).  Firms with more growth options in their investment 
opportunity set are more likely to issue private debt (Krishnaswami et al. (1999)).   
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There is evidence that the firm’s life cycle and credit quality also affect the corporate 
debt choice.  The close monitoring and the covenants associated with bank debt and non-bank 
traditional private debt reduce the cost of debt for small firms that are early in their life cycle and 
have not had the opportunity to build a reputation about their credit quality yet (Berger and Udell 
(1998)).  Firms in the early stages of their life cycle create credit reputation through bank loans; 
this reputation is later used to access the public debt market (Diamond (1991)).  Indeed firm’s 
age is positively related to the probability of issuing public instead of private debt (Johnson 
(1997)).  Firms with high credit quality prefer public debt, firms with average credit quality tend 
to borrow from banks, and firms with poor credit quality rely mostly on non-bank private debt 
(Denis and Mihov (2003)).6 
While controlling for all these factors, this study mainly focuses on two empirical 
questions.  The first empirical question is related to the introduction of 144A debt in 1990 and 
the role that 144A debt has played among different corporate debt choices for US firms after its 
introduction.  Firms issue 144A debt without contractual obligations such as covenants or 
collateral.  Moreover, contrary to traditional private debt placements, 144A debt is usually 
subordinated and monitoring by investors is practically non-existent.  The main benefits of 144A 
debt are speed of issuance due to the absence of an initial registration requirement, and high 
liquidity due to the possibility to essentially convert the issue into a public bond at a later date 
Fenn (2000)).  Before the introduction of 144A issues in 1990, in many cases traditional private 
debt securities were sold to a limited group of institutional investors, usually insurance 
                                                 
6 Event studies and long-term performance studies following debt placements provide complementary evidence to 
debt choice studies.  Dichev and Piotroski (1999) report non-significant long-term returns following public straight 
debt issues but positive long-term returns following private debt issues.  Chandra and Nayar (2008) further 
investigate this issue and find positive returns at the time of the announcement of private debt, but a negative long-
term performance following issuance of private debt. Chang et al. (2007) show that low-quality firms can improve 
debt announcement returns by issuing secured debt. 
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companies, with an agreement to register the securities promptly (Johnson (1991)).  Since 144A 
securities work essentially in the same way, they might have replaced traditional private 
placements of high-risk debt after the credit crunch in the traditional private debt market for 
speculative-grade debt at the beginning of the 1990s. 
According to this hypothesis, firms that preferentially issue 144A debt should be 
significantly different not only from bank borrowers but also from firms that privately place debt 
securities without using the 144A rule.  Firms that issue 144A debt should be characterized by 
lower credit quality and higher information asymmetry than firms that issue traditional non-bank 
private debt.  
The second empirical question concerns the quality of traditional private debt issuers in 
comparison to bank borrowers.  Banks are able to reduce the risk of their lending arrangements 
through diversification (Diamond (1984)).  Since banks entertain relationships with many 
borrowing firms, even when some borrowers default, banks regularly receive enough cash from 
the remaining borrowers to secure payment to lenders.  In contrast, the accredited and 
sophisticated investors that participate in the traditional private debt market cannot freely trade 
the debt securities for at least one year from the purchasing date, and unlike banks they often 
lend personal funds to the borrowing firm.  As a consequence, traditional private debt investors 
might be willing to commit their capital only to high credit quality firms with low risk of default. 
The credit quality of bank borrowers and traditional private debt issuers might differ for 
additional reasons.  Bank debt potentially mitigates costs of information asymmetry better than 
traditional private debt because banks tend to maintain long-term relationships with borrowing 
firms and accumulate soft information about these firms (Fama (1985), Diamond (1991)).  In 
addition, banks are able to quickly renegotiate loans and therefore could have superior ability to 
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contain financial losses in case of borrowers’ financial distress than non-bank traditional private 
lenders.  Finally, most publicly-traded firms make large use of syndicated loans.7  As each bank 
in the syndicate holds only a portion of the loan, the borrowing firm’s credit risk is shared among 
the syndicate members. Consistent with this argument, Angbazo et al. (1998) find that leveraged 
syndicated loans have lower yield spreads than other leveraged borrowing arrangements. As a 
consequence, firms with lower credit quality might more easily borrow through syndicated loans 
than traditional non-bank private debt. 
According to this hypothesis bank loans should not be the preferred private debt source 
for good credit quality firms.  Smaller firms with good credit quality that prefer not to access the 
public market because of high flotation costs and information asymmetry should be more likely 
to use traditional private placements rather than bank loans.  Section 4 and 5 present the 
univariate and multivariate tests of these hypotheses. 
 
3.  Sample and variables 
3.1 Sample selection and formation 
I collect issue characteristics from SDC Global Issues, stock information from CRSP, and 
accounting data from Compustat.  Since the SDC coverage of bank loans is not complete before 
1995, I only consider debt issues by non-financial U.S. firms from 1995 to 2003.  The total 
number of debt issues by non-financial U.S. firms during this period is 33,663.  Private issues 
represent 71% of the sample.  Among private issues, bank loans represent the largest portion.  
Out of 24,022 private issues by U.S. firms between 1995 and 2003, 14,000 (58%) are bank loans. 
I then eliminate short-term debt (debt with maturity less or equal to one year), issues by 
firms that are not covered by CRSP or Compustat, and issues of financial subsidiaries of 
                                                 
7 The majority of loans in the sample of this study consists of syndicated loans. 
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manufacturing firms (e.g., GE Mortgage Services, and GMAC). After these screenings the 
sample consists of 17,499 issues and 3,532 unique firms. 
Since firms often borrow from banks using multiple tranches the same day, I aggregate 
all tranches into a single issue by adding up the principals of the tranches as in Gomes and 
Phillips (2007).  Moreover, since firms place debt securities with the same characteristics within 
a limited period (Denis and Mihov (2003)), I aggregate debt issues of the same type by firm by 
quarter.  In related studies, Gomes and Phillips (2007) aggregate debt issues by type within each 
month, Denis and Mihov (2003) aggregate within each year, and Arena and Howe (2009) 
aggregate within each quarter.  Aggregating by quarter reduces statistical dependency without 
significantly losing statistical power.8 
The principal of the aggregated debt is the sum of the principals of the single debt issues, 
while the maturity and yield of the aggregated debt is the weighted average of maturities and 
yields of the single issues.  After this sample selection procedure, the sample consists of 2,170 
firms and a total of 9,478 debt issues.  I present the distribution of debt issues after 3-month 
aggregation by year and type in Table 1.  Private issues represent the majority of the debt issues 
in the sample (78.58%).  Among private issues, bank loans contribute 56.71 percent of the 
sample, 144A private placements 14.60 percent, and traditional private placements 7.27 percent.  
The year with the smallest amount of debt issues is 2000.  Aside from 1995, 144A placements 
are more numerous than traditional private placements. 
To my knowledge, this sample is the largest to date among multivariate studies which 
aggregate debt.  By way of comparison, Denis and Mihov (2003) analyze 1,560 issues during 
1995 and 1996.  The sample of this study has 2,017 issues for the years 1995 and 1996.  Even 
after aggregating debt financings within one year as Denis and Mihov (2003), the sample 
                                                 
8 The main results of this study do not change if debt is aggregated by year or by month. 
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consists of 1,817 issues for 1995-1996.  Moreover, the sample of this study is not only larger in 
the cross-section but also across time, spanning over nine years, from 1995 to 2003.9 
In addition to the main sample, in section 6 I also consider a longer time-series sample of 
traditional private debt issuers from 1981 to 2003 to investigate in a univariate setting  the 
change in firm characteristics of traditional private debt issuers before and after the introduction 
of the 144A rule.  This sample consists of a total of 6,080 firm-issues, 3,220 before 1990 and 
2,860 after 1990.10 
 
3.2  Variables 
Appendix A describes the variables and their sources.  I use firm size and issue size as 
proxies for flotation costs.  I use both the firm’s market capitalization (Marketcap) and the total 
assets (Assets) calculated at the end of the fiscal year preceding the issue as proxies for firm size.  
I calculate the size of the issue as the principal of the debt issue (Principal) obtained by adding 
the principals of the issues aggregated every quarter, as described in Section 3.1. 
 I calculate firm age (Age) as the number of years between the CRSP listing date and the 
issue date.  I use age both to test Diamond’s (1991) life cycle theory and to control for 
unobservable credit risk as in Johnson (1997). 11 
I use Q and capital expenditures (Capexp_ta) as proxies for growth opportunities.  As in 
Smith and Watts (1992), I calculate Q as the ratio of the market value of equity minus the book 
                                                 
9 The sample of this study is also about 12% larger than the Gomes and Phillips (2007) debt sample.  The difference 
in size would be even larger if in this study debt were aggregated within one month as in Gomes and Phillips (2007) 
instead of three months.  Eckbo et al. (2007) report descriptive statistics on a longitudinally larger sample.  
 
10 This sample starts in 1981 because SDC starts full coverage of U.S. traditional private placements in that year. 
11 For the t-tests and multivariate analysis I use the natural logarithm of firm size, issue size, and firm age. 
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value of equity plus the book value of assets to the book value of assets.  I calculate Capexp_ta 
as capital expenditures (item 128 on Compustat) divided by assets. 
As in Denis and Mihov (2003) I use credit rating as a proxy for credit quality.  This study 
considers both the rating of the issuer and the rating of each issue since rating agencies not only 
rate issuers but also single debt obligations.  Issuer credit ratings are opinions on a firm’s 
capacity to meet its overall financial obligations.  Issue credit ratings are instead opinions of the 
creditworthiness of a firm with respect to a specific financial obligation and take into account the 
terms and conditions of the obligation as well as the creditworthiness of guarantors, insurers, and 
the presence of other forms of credit enhancement.12  I convert ratings into numbers using the 
numeric transformation of Klock et al. (2005) as reported in Appendix B.  I create the issue 
rating variable by converting Moody’s and S&P issue ratings reported on SDC – Global Issues 
into numbers and then averaging them.  In the event that only one of the two rating agencies 
covers a specific issue, I use the corresponding number.  To construct the issuer rating variable I 
follow a similar method with the only difference that I merge the S&P ratings provided by SDC 
and Compustat to augment the sample size.  Overall I have 4,959 out of 9,478 issues with ratings 
(52.3%), and 7,634 out of 9,478 issues with issuer ratings (80.5%). 
As in Faulkender and Petersen (2006), I create an indicator variable equal to one when 
neither S&P or Moody’s rate the issuing firm (Missing_rating).  This indicator controls for the 
firm’s access to public debt. While the other variables in this study are possible determinants of 
the corporate choice among different types of debt (demand side), the Missing_rating variable 
serves as a proxy for the constraints on a firm’s ability to issue public rather than private debt 
(supply side). 
                                                 
12 Bank loans were not rated before 1995. As indicated by Yi and Mullineaux (2006), in 1995 rating agencies started 
rating syndicated loans. 
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As shown by Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) and Ziebart and Reiter (1992), accounting and 
financial information  can predict about two-thirds of the variability of credit ratings.  Private 
insider information that rating agencies receive from firms that solicit ratings are partly 
responsible for the unexplained one-third of credit rating variability (Fairchild et al. (2009)).  
Following previous studies on the explanatory power of credit ratings I consider variables that 
are related to credit ratings and that proxy for interest coverage, capital structure, profitability, 
size, debt subordination status, and stability.13 
The interest coverage variable, Int_cov, is equal to operating income before depreciation 
divided by interest expense.  I calculate Leverage as total debt divided by total assets.  As a 
measure of profitability I calculate return on assets (ROA).  I measure ROA as net income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets.  As an alternative proxy of profitability, I construct 
an indicator equal to one if the net income before extraordinary items is negative in the fiscal 
year prior to the issue, and zero otherwise (Loss).  As a measure of the subordination status of 
debt, I create an indicator variable equal to one when the firm has subordinated debt outstanding, 
and zero otherwise (Subord).  I use fixed assets (Fixed_assets) and idiosyncratic volatility (Ivol) 
as measures of stability.  I calculate Fixed_assets as gross PPE divided by total assets.  Ivol is the 
monthly percentage idiosyncratic volatility of the firm, calculated as the standard deviation of the 
residuals of the Fama and French (1993) model obtained by regressing daily returns from month  
-15 to month -3 before the issue, and multiplied by the square root of 22.14  Idiosyncratic 
volatility is a measure of stability of cash flows since it is strictly related to the volatility of 
future expected cash flows.  I use Ivol also as a proxy for information asymmetry about firm-
                                                 
13 Butera and Faff (2006) provide an overview on how banks use firm characteristics to estimate credit ratings. 
14 When I estimate Ivol using the market model my results do not significantly change. 
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specific information as in Krishnaswami et al. (1999).  If investors and managers are equally 
informed about market-wide risk, then residual volatility captures information asymmetry. 
Another measure of credit quality based on accounting ratios is Altman (1977) Z.  I 
calculate Altman’s Z as 1.2 (Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained Earnings/Total 
Assets) + 3.3 (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets) + 0.6 (Market Value of 
Equity/Book Value of Long-Term Debt) + (Net Sales/Total Assets).  I create an indicator 
variable equal to one when Altman’s Z is smaller than 1.81 (Altman), that is when the firm is at 
risk of bankruptcy.   
In addition to issue size, I consider two other issue characteristics: years to maturity and 
yield spread to maturity.  I calculate years to maturity of the three-month aggregated debt as the 
duration weighted maturity of all the aggregated issues (Years_m).  Yield spread to maturity 
(Yield_m) is the offer yield spread to maturity of the 3-month aggregated debt over the Treasury 
security of similar maturity. 
 
4. Univariate analysis 
4.1   Issuer and issue characteristics 
Table 2 presents the means and medians of issue and firm characteristics for firms that 
issue public securities, bank loans, 144A securities, and traditional private debt securities.  The 
mean (median) total assets of public issuers are $15,086 million ($6,434 million), while the mean 
(median) market capitalization is $15,925 million ($5,185 million).  Consistent with previous 
studies on the corporate choice between private and public debt, the sample firms that issue 
public bonds are on average larger and older than firms that issue private debt.  The mean 
(median) total assets of private issuers are $4,989 million ($1,063 million), while the mean 
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(median) market capitalization is $4,426 million ($731 million).  Among private issuers, bank 
borrowers are the smallest (mean total assets of $ 4,038 million, and mean market capitalization 
of $ 3,944 million). 
Public issues have an average size of $557 million, average maturity of 12.4 years, and 
average yield spread to maturity of 4.8 percent.  Consistent with previous studies, private issues 
are smaller, have shorter maturity, and offer a greater yield.  Private issues have an average size 
of $377 million, average maturity of 6.1 years, and average yield spread to maturity of 6.5 
percent.  The average credit rating of public debt issuers and issues corresponds to BBB+ (Baa1), 
while the average credit rating of private issuers and issues correspond to BB+ (Ba1) and BB 
(Ba2) respectively. 
Among private issuers, firms that issue 144A debt have the largest leverage, the lowest Q, 
the lowest return on assets, are more likely to have posted a net loss the year preceding the issue, 
have the lowest interest coverage, are the most likely to have subordinated debt outstanding and 
Altman’s Z below 1.81, and are those with the lowest issuer credit ratings.  These results suggest 
that 144A issuers are on average lower-quality and higher-risk firms compared to other private 
issuers. 
4.2   Differences between issuers of different debt claims 
Table 3 presents a series of two sample tests between the different types of debt financing.  
Since the same firm can issue different types of debt at different times, this analysis is affected 
by dependency among different debt groups.  To control for this dependency I calculate the p-
values of the difference of the means by way of an unbalanced mixed model of variance with 
random firm and year effects. 
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Private issuers are significantly smaller, younger, have a larger proportion of debt in their 
capital structure, are significantly less profitable, are more likely to have posted a net loss the 
year before the placement, are more likely to have subordinated debt outstanding, are more likely 
to have an Altman’s Z below 1.81, are characterized by larger information asymmetry, and have 
a significant lower issuer credit rating.  These results are consistent with the view that private 
issuers are characterized by lower credit quality than public issuers.  The two-sample tests of 
issue characteristics show that private issues are significantly smaller, have shorter maturity, and 
offer higher yields than public issues. 
The growth opportunities measure, Q (market-to-book), is significantly larger for public 
issuers.  Even though this result appears to be inconsistent with Yosha (1995), it might be driven 
by firms in financial distress.  The market value of equity of firms in financial distress is usually 
close to their book value, and therefore their Q is close to one.  This result is thus consistent with 
private issuers having lower quality than public issuers and corroborates the result presented in 
Table 2: 144A issuers, usually high-yield issuers, are the ones with the lowest Q.  An alternative 
explanation for this result is related to the agency problem of free-cash flows (Jensen (1986)). 
High investment firms (firms with larger Q) are not as affected by free-cash flow problems and 
are less dependent on the disciplinary role of debt (Jensen (1986)).   These firms will be in less 
need to subject themselves to the monitoring of banks or traditional private investors to reduce 
debt financing costs.  Consistent with this argument, Chen and Zhao (2006) find that firms with 
higher market-to-book ratios (more growth opportunities) face significantly lower public debt 
costs (lower spreads), ceteris paribus.   
The central column of Table 3 shows that 144A issues are significantly different from 
traditional non-bank private placements across many characteristics.  Firms that issue 144A debt 
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are significantly younger, with more leverage, and a lower proportion of fixed assets.  More 
importantly, 144A issuers have significantly lower credit quality and higher information 
asymmetry than firms that issue traditional non-bank private debt.  Specifically, firms that issue 
144A debt are significantly more likely to have posted a net loss the year prior to the placement, 
are significantly more likely to have subordinated debt outstanding, are more likely to have an 
Altman’s Z below 1.81, are characterized by a significantly higher firm-specific risk (i.e., 
idiosyncratic volatility), and have a significant lower credit rating.  Firms that issue 144A debt 
are also more likely to have a Moody’s or S&P credit rating than traditional private debt issuers. 
This result suggests that while many firms issue traditional private debt because they do not have 
access to the public market, most 144A issuers intentionally choose 144A debt over public debt. 
Overall, the significant differences in credit ratings and other proxies for credit quality, 
such as the presence of subordinated debt and the likelihood to have posted a negative income in 
the year preceding the issue, suggest the following pecking order of debt financing source by 
issuer quality: (1) public bond offerings, (2) traditional private offerings, (3) bank loans, and (4) 
144A placements.  Issuers of traditional private placements have better credit quality than other 
private issuers.  Their credit quality, however, is not as good as that of public issuers.  Firms that 
issue traditional private debt might choose not to issue debt publicly both because of credit 
quality and information asymmetry considerations and the barrier constituted by flotation costs.  
Traditional private issuers are indeed on average $8,554 million smaller than public issuers and 
place on average $475 million less than public issuers. 
This pecking order is different from the one reported by Denis and Mihov (2003) who find 
that firms that issue non-bank private placements have lower credit quality than bank borrowers.   
Denis and Mihov (2003) group 144A debt and traditional private placement together.  Since, as 
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shown in Table 1, 144A debt issues are more numerous than traditional private placements, it is 
possible that Denis and Mihov’s result is driven by the low credit quality of 144A issuers.  I 
investigate this possibility in section 6. 
The results of Table 3 suggest that after the credit crunch in the private placement market 
(Carey et al. (1993)) and the introduction of 144A issues at the beginning of the 1990s, 144A 
debt replaced traditional private debt placements for low credit quality firms.  The results of 
Table 3 also show that traditional private debt issuers have better credit quality than firms that 
make use of bank loans.  As argued by Diamond (1984), banks reduce the risk of their lending 
arrangements through diversification. Alternatively, the accredited and sophisticated investors 
that participate in the traditional private debt market cannot trade the debt securities for at least 
one year from the purchasing date, and unlike banks they sometimes lend personal funds to the 
borrowing firm.  Consistent with this difference between banks and traditional private debt 
lenders, the results presented in Table 3 show that traditional private debt investors are willing to 
commit their capital only to high credit quality firms with low risk of default. 
 
4.3   Credit ratings 
While issuer credit ratings depend on the firm’s capacity to meet its overall financial 
obligations, issue credit ratings depend also on the terms and conditions and other forms of credit 
enhancement of that specific debt obligation.  I analyze both types of ratings to provide 
descriptive information on what form of debt firms can issue to enhance creditor protection so as 
to benefit from a lower yield.   
In order to compare issue ratings with issuer ratings, in this section I consider only the 
4,662 debt issues for which I have information about both ratings.  The average bond issuer has a 
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credit rating of 14.88 that corresponds to Moody’s Baa1, while bond issues on average have a 
rating of 15.10 (Baa1).  The average bank borrower has a rating of 11.38 that corresponds to 
Moody’s Ba2.  Bank loans have on average a rating of 11.51 (Ba2).  The average 144A issuer 
has a rating of 10.83 that corresponds to Moody’s Ba2, while 144A issues on average have a 
rating of 10.01 (Ba3).  The average private placement issuer has a rating of 14.20 that 
corresponds to Moody’s Baa2, while private placements on average have a rating of 14.55 
(Baa1). 
Table 4 presents the pair t-tests for issue and issuer ratings by type of debt financing.  The 
ratings of public bonds and bank loans are significantly higher than the ratings of their issuers, 
while the ratings of 144A issues are significantly lower than the ratings of their issuers.  Bank 
covenants and bank monitoring improve creditor protection and therefore increase the bank loan 
credit rating compared to the credit rating of the borrowing firm.  Conversely, firms make use of 
the 144A market to rapidly issue speculative-grade bonds (Fenn (2000)).  The result presented in 
Table 4 is a direct consequence of the contractual differences between 144A debt and other 
forms of corporate debt.  As stated by Fenn (2000), in contrast to other types of private 
placements and public bonds, 144A debt securities lack specific contractual terms and conditions 
that firms usually put in place to decrease the probability of default and the cost of debt.  
 
5.  Multivariate analysis 
5.1  Choice among different forms of debt financing 
I analyze the firm characteristics that influence the firm’s choice between different forms of 
debt by means of a two-stage multinomial logistic regression with year and firm random effects 
to control for the longitudinal nature of my sample.  As shown by Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) and 
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Ziebart and Reiter (1992), credit ratings are related to several firm characteristics that are also 
important determinants of the corporate decision on the type of debt to be issued.  Therefore 
regressing credit ratings along with other firm characteristics would generate multicollinearity 
and erroneously affect the significance of the regression coefficients.  To avoid multicollinearity 
I implement a two-step procedure.  In the first step I regress issuer credit ratings on variables that 
have been found to be related to ratings to calculate the residuals.  The residual variable created 
this way is highly correlated with the issuer credit rating variable, but is orthogonal to the other 
explanatory variables.  In the second step I estimate a random-effect multinomial logistic 
regression with four dependent outcomes (public, bank, traditional private, and 144A) and the 
residuals of the first regression and several firm and issue characteristics as independent 
variables.  The orthogonality between the rating residual variable and the other independent 
variables assures a correct estimation of the coefficients in the multinomial logistic regression.15 
In the second step I estimate the debt choice regression using firm and year random effects.  
Firm random effects allow to control for unobserved firm cross-sectional differences while year 
random effects allow to control for the longitudinal structure of the sample.  The random effects 
estimation uses both within and between firm variation of firm characteristics but does not treat 
observations for a given firm as independent.  Standard errors are adjusted to reflect the cross-
correlation between observations due to common firm components.  The random effect approach 
is also supported by the Hausman test which does not reject the null hypothesis that random 
effects are efficient and consistent.16    To avoid dropping observations with missing ratings I 
apply a method often used to avoid losing observations with missing Compustat variables (e.g., 
                                                 
15 Altman’s Z is another variable that is potentially correlated to other financial accounting variables used in the 
regression.  However, the variance inflation factor (VIF) of Altman’s Z is less than 2, revealing that there is no 
multicollinearity between Altman’s Z and the other independent variables. 
16 The result of Hausman test suggests that the firm and year effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables, 
confirming that random effects is the appropriate approach. 
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Palia (2001) and Fama and French (2002)).  This method consists of setting the missing ratings 
to zero and introducing an indicator variable (Missing_rating) that is set to unity for the missing 
observations.  The variable Missing_rating also controls for the firm’s access to public markets 
as in Faulkender and Petersen (2006). 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the result of the OLS regression used to calculate the rating 
residuals.  All firm characteristics but interest coverage are significantly related to issuer credit 
rating.  As shown by the large value of the adjusted R-squared (0.70), variables related to firm 
size, age, profitability, and stability explain a great portion of the credit rating variability.  This 
result is consistent with previous studies on the relation between accounting and financial 
measures and credit ratings (e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz (1979)).17 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regressions with random 
effects. Consistent with previous studies, firms that issue public debt are larger and issue a larger 
amount of debt than firms that issue private debt of any type.  Public issuers are also 
characterized by lower information asymmetry.  Consistent with Denis and Mihov (2003) public 
issuers have better credit ratings than private issuers even after controlling for other firm 
characteristics. Firms with larger Q are more likely to issue public debt.  This result might be 
driven by firms in financial distress that preferentially issue 144A debt.  Another possible reason 
for this result is that high investment firms (firms with larger Q) are less affected by the Jensen 
(1986) free cash flow agency problem and do not need to submit to the monitoring of banks and 
traditional private investors to contain debt financing costs. 
Most firm characteristics related to credit quality that are significantly different between 
public issuers and 144A issuers or bank borrowers (i.e., probability of bankruptcy, net loss the 
                                                 
17 The first-step of this analysis is an OLS regression instead of an ordinal logit because logit regressions do not 
provide residuals.  It is important to notice that when an ordered logit is estimated instead of an OLS regression, the 
magnitude, sign, and significance of the coefficients are very similar to those presented in panel A of Table 6. 
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year before the issue, outstanding subordinated debt, and leverage) are not significantly different 
between public issuers and firms that place traditional private debt.  The lack of access to the 
debt public market (measured by Missing_rating) is instead a significant determinant of the 
probability of issuing traditional private debt.  These results support the view that firms that 
place traditional private debt securities are characterized by good credit quality and do not issue 
public debt mainly because of the constraints imposed by flotation costs and information 
asymmetry. 
The difference between traditional private placements and 144A placements is evident in 
the column that presents the coefficients of the regression that has as dependent variable the log-
odds ratio of the probability of issuing traditional private debt versus 144A debt.  Firms that 
place traditional private debt securities to accredited and sophisticated investors are significantly 
larger but place significantly less debt.  They have lower information asymmetry, are less likely 
to post a net loss the year before the placement, have a significantly lower probability of 
bankruptcy, have a larger percentage of fixed assets to total assets, smaller leverage, and are less 
likely to have subordinated debt outstanding.  Even though the two groups do not significantly 
differ in the unexplained portion of credit rating, the significant coefficients suggest that these 
two types of placements are significantly different and better quality firms are more likely to 
issue traditional private placements.18 
In unreported multinomial logit regressions I add three macroeconomic variables as 
suggested by Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) and Cantillo and Wright (2000): standard deviations 
                                                 
18 As shown in Table 2, only 46% of the firms that issue traditional private placements are rated by either Moody’s 
or S&P.  The lack of significance of the difference in credit rating between private issuers and 144A issuers might 
be caused by the absence of credit ratings for many companies that issue traditional private placements.   However, 
missing ratings do not decrease the sample size.  I avoid dropping observations with missing ratings by setting the 
missing ratings to zero and introducing an indicator variable (Missing_rating) that is set to unity for the missing 
observations (a similar approach for missing data is used by Fama and French (2002) and Palia (2001)). 
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of the daily 10-year constant maturity treasury bond rate over the 20 days prior to the issue, 
aggregate intermediary earnings, and the risk-free rate.  These variables are not significant while 
the other variables do not change in significance when compared to the reported results.19 
Table 6 presents the change in the implied probability of issuing a particular form of debt 
when the value of each variable of the multinomial logistic regressions presented in Table 5 
increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile (or from zero to one for indicator variables) while all 
the other variables retain their median values.  Firm size, measured as logarithm of total assets, is 
the variable with the greatest economic significance.  When firm size increases from the 25th to 
the 75th percentile, the probability of issuing public debt increases by 20.6 percent while the 
probability of issuing bank loans decreases by 34.3 percent.  Proxies of financial distress, such as 
Altman and Subord, are characterized by large implied probabilities of opposite sign for public 
debt and 144A issues.  The unexplained portion of credit ratings is large and positive for public 
bonds and large and negative for 144A issues. An increase of the credit rating residual variable 
equal to its interquartile range increases the probability of issuing public debt by 6.8 percent, 
while decreases the probability of issuing 144A debt by 5.6 percent.  The probability of issuing 
bank loans or traditional private placements is only marginally influenced by credit rating 
residuals (-0.8% and -0.4%).  These results are consistent with the pecking order among different 
debt claims: low-risk firms are more likely to issue public debt while high-risk firms are more 
likely to participate in the 144A market. 
 Another economically significant variable is idiosyncratic volatility (Ivol).  An increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility equal to its interquartile range decreases the probability of issuing public 
debt by 12.0 percent, while it increases the probability of issuing bank loans by 7.0 percent and 
                                                 
19 These regressions are available upon request from the author. 
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the probability of issuing 144A debt by 5.3 percent.  Leverage (measured before the debt issue) 
has a large influence on the probability of borrowing from banks.  An increase of leverage equal 
to its interquartile range, decreases the probability of issuing bank loans by 10.2 percent, while 
increases the probability of issuing 144A debt by 6.9 percent.  Even though Q is statistically 
significant in three out of the six specifications presented in Panel B of Table 5, it has little 
economic significance. 
Table 6 also shows how, aside from firm size and the absence of credit rating 
(Missing_rating), no issuer characteristic has economic significance on the probability to choose 
traditional private placements.  The low values of these implied probability changes and the large 
and opposite values for public debt and 144A debt suggest that traditional private placements lie 
in between public debt and other sources of private debt.  This result is consistent with the 
evidence presented in previous tables. 
 
6.  Additional tests and robustness check 
6.1. Are the Denis and Mihov (2003) results on non-bank private debt driven by 144A issues? 
The results presented in Section 5 show that traditional private debt issuers differ 
significantly from 144A debt issuers.  Denis and Mihov (2003) merge traditional private debt 
issuers and 144A debt issuers together and show that these firms have lower credit quality than 
bank borrowers.  In order to verify that firms that issue 144A debt drive their result, I repeat the 
regression presented in Panel B of Table 5 merging 144A and traditional private debt issuers into 
the same group.  The results of these multinomial regressions are presented in Table 7.  The sign 
and significance of the coefficients of the credit quality variables clearly show that the non-bank 
private issuers (144A and traditional private debt issuers together) have lower credit quality than 
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bank borrowers consistent with Denis and Mihov (2003).  The results of Table 5 and Table 7, 
when interpreted jointly, show that 144A debt issuers are the main cause of the non-bank private 
issuers result in Denis and Mihov (2003) and provide evidence of the different role played by 
144A debt in debt markets in comparison to traditional private debt. 
 
6.2 Suggestive evidence on the evolution in the traditional private debt market at the 
beginning of the 1990s 
As shown in section 5, firms that issue traditional private debt are characterized by better 
credit quality than 144A debt issuers.  As observed in the introduction, the implementation of 
144A debt in 1990 might have created a new outlet for low credit quality firms raising debt 
capital.  In this section I provide suggestive evidence of this conjecture by comparing firm 
characteristics of traditional private placement issuers before and after 1990 in a univariate 
setting.  Table 8 presents the results.  With the exception of ROA, all the firm characteristics 
related to credit quality of traditional private debt issuers are significantly different before and 
after 1990.  Firms that issued traditional private debt after 1990 have lower leverage, are less 
likely to have Altman’s Z lower than 1.81, are less likely to have posted a loss in the previous 
year, and are less likely to have subordinated debt outstanding than firms that issued traditional 
private debt before 1990. 
The results on credit ratings are a further confirmation of the change in the characteristics 
of traditional private debt issuers in the wake of the 144A debt introduction.  After 1990 the 
average traditional private debt issuer has a credit rating of A- (15.98), compared to a credit 
rating between BBB and BBB+ (14.42) before 1990.  Moreover, before 1990 the majority of 
rated private debt issuers are speculative grade (rated BB+ or lower) while after 1990 the 
majority of rated traditional private debt issuers are investment grade.  The decrease in the 
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average numbers of issues per year after 1990 offers additional support to the view that the good 
credit quality of traditional private debt issuers in recent years might be due to the use of the 
144A market by private debt issuers in junk status.  Chandra and Nayar (2008) find that negative 
long-term stock performance following the issuance of traditional private debt.  The results of 
this study are consistent with theirs.  Their sample starts in 1981 and ends in 1999.  More than 
half of the debt issues in their sample predate the introduction of 144A debt in 1990. 
 
 
6.3 Multinomial debt choice regressions without rating residual regression step 
As described in the previous section, Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of multinomial 
logit regressions that include a rating residual variable obtained by a first-step rating regression.  
Denis and Mihov (2003) do not use a two-step procedure, but rather control for credit quality by 
simply using a credit rating indicator variable equal to one for investment grade firms and zero 
otherwise.  For sake of comparability, Table 9 presents the results of multinomial logit 
regressions in which the rating residual variable is substituted by the investment-grade rating 
dummy.  The sign and significance of the coefficients are consistent with those presented in 
Table 5.  The only exception is the Rating_dummy variable being positive and significant for 
traditional private debt versus 144A debt.  This result is consistent with the sign and significance 
of the other credit quality variables both in Table 5 and Table 9. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
The results of this study reexamine the conventional view of non-bank private placements 
as a source of funds for poor credit quality firms.  Even though the conventional view might have 
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been valid for private debt issues until the beginning of the 1990s, I show that for the sample 
period considered in this study (1995-2003) the pecking order of debt choices conditional on 
credit quality is different from previous studies.  I found that high credit quality firms generally 
prefer public bond offerings. In addition, good credit quality firms, which are not large enough to 
overcome the barrier constituted by flotation costs and information asymmetry, are more likely 
to raise capital through traditional private offerings. A large group of firms characterized by 
moderate credit quality make extensive use of bank loans, and poor credit quality, high-risk firms 
preferentially issue 144A debt. 
Traditional private placements are issued on average by firms characterized by better 
credit quality than bank borrowers.  The introduction of the 144A debt market in 1990 has 
created an outlet for speculative-grade issuers at practically the same time in which these firms 
saw their traditional investors (i.e., insurance companies) shy away due to the worsening of 
insurance companies’ financial conditions.  A possible explanation for the evidence presented in 
this study is that the credit crunch in the speculative-grade private placement market might have 
shifted the traditional private placement market towards better credit quality firms with limited 
access to the public debt market. 
 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003; Yi and Mullineaux (2006)
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Appendix A: Variable definitions and sources 
 
This table lists and describes the variables ordered by source.  All firm characteristics are measured for 
the fiscal year preceding the debt issue. 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Altman Indicator variable equal to one when Altman’s (1977) Z is 
smaller than 1.81.  Altman's Z is calculated as 1.2 (Working 
Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 
3.3 (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets) + 0.6 
(Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Long-Term Debt) + 
(Net Sales/Total Assets) 
Compustat 
Assets Total assets of the firm expressed in millions of dollars  Compustat 
Capexp_ta Capital expenditures divided by total assets Compustat 
Fixed_assets Fraction of fixed assets calculated as gross PPE divided by 
total assets Compustat 
Int_cov Interest coverage calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, 
amortization and depreciation divided by interest expense Compustat 
Leverage  Total debt divided by total assets before the dent issue Compustat 
Lnassets Natural logarithm of Assets Compustat 
Loss Indicator variable equal to one if  the net income before 
extraordinary item is negative, and zero otherwise Compustat 
Q Ratio of the market value of equity minus the book value of 
equity plus the book value of assets to the book value of assets Compustat 
Rating_dummy Indicator variable equal to one when the firm is rated 
investment grade, and zero otherwise Compustat 
Rating_issuer Numerical conversion (see Appendix B) of S&P and Moody’s 
issuer credit ratings Compustat 
Rating_res See Table 6 and Table 7 headers Compustat 
Missing_rating Indicator variable equal to one when the firm is not rated by 
S&P or Moody’s, and zero otherwise Compustat and SDC
ROA Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets Compustat 
Subord Indicator variable equal to one when the firm has subordinated 
debt, and zero otherwise Compustat 
Age Number of years from the CRSP listing date to the offering 
date CRSP 
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Appendix A - Continued  
Variable Definition Source 
Ivol Monthly percent idiosyncratic volatility three months 
before the issue calculated as the standard deviation of the 
residuals of the Fama and French (1993) model obtained by 
regressing daily returns from month -15 to month -3 before 
the issue 
CRSP 
Marketcap Market capitalization of the firm three months before the 
debt issue 
CRSP 
Years_m Years to final maturity of the debt issue SDC 
Yield_m Yield spread to maturity of the debt issue over the Treasury security of similar maturity SDC 
Principal  Size of the debt offering expressed in millions of dollars  SDC 
Public Indicator equal to 1 when the debt issue is a public bond SDC 
Bank Indicator equal to 1 when the debt issue is a bank loan SDC 
144A Indicator equal to 1 when the debt issue is a 144A debt placement SDC 
Traditional private Indicator equal to 1 when the debt issue is a traditional private placement SDC 
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Appendix B: Credit rating numerical conversions 
 
This table presents the conversion numbers of Moody’s and S&P ratings used in this study for both 
univariate and multivariate analyses. 
 
 
Conversion 
Number  
Moody's 
Ratings  
S&P 
Ratings 
22 Aaa  AAA 
21 Aa1  AA+ 
20 Aa2  AA 
19 Aa3 AA- 
18 A1 A+ 
17 A2  A 
16 A3 A- 
15 Baa1  BBB+ 
14 Baa2  BBB 
13 Baa3  BBB- 
12 Ba1  BB+ 
11 Ba2  BB 
10 Ba3  BB- 
9 B1  B+ 
8 B2 B 
7 B3 B- 
6 Caa1  CCC+ 
5 Caa2 CCC 
4 Caa3  CCC- 
3 Ca  CC 
2 C  C 
1 D D 
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Table 1 
Sample Debt Issues after 3-Month Aggregation 
 
 
     Private Issues 
Year All Issues Public Private  
Bank 
Loans 144A 
Traditional 
Private 
1995 956 262 694  506 53 135 
1996 1061 273 788  594 107 87 
1997 1370 264 1106  824 199 83 
1998 1341 299 1042  689 258 95 
1999 999 212 787  536 167 84 
2000 818 142 676  563 63 50 
2001 979 205 774  513 202 59 
2002 932 201 731  559 130 42 
2003 1022 172 850  591 205 54 
Total 9478 2030 7448  5375 1384 689 
Percentage  21.42% 78.58%  56.71% 14.60% 7.27% 
 
 
This table reports long-term debt issues from 1995 to 2003 for U.S. non-financial firms covered by both 
CRSP and Compustat. I aggregate offerings of the same type every three months. “Traditional Private” 
consists of traditional private placements to accredited and sophisticated investors. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics – Firm and Issue Characteristics 
 
 
  Public 
Bonds 
Private 
Offerings 
Bank 
Loans 
144A 
Issues 
Traditional 
Private   
Assets 15086.46 4989.20 4037.74 7926.07 6532.72 
 (6434.07) (1062.64) (910.82) (1596.90) (1137.51) 
Marketcap 15925.85 4426.27 3944.47 5430.82 6187.36 
 (5185.05) (730.52) (683.70) (872.48) (925.56) 
Age 24.98 15.79 15.50 15.51 18.58 
 (29.62) (10.88) (10.46) (9.98) (16.30) 
Leverage 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.51 0.34 
 (0.34) (0.37) (0.35) (0.49) (0.32) 
Q 1.81 1.63 1.66 1.52 1.64 
 (1.49) (1.37) (1.38) (1.28) (1.41) 
ROA 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) 
Loss 0.12 0.26 0.25 0.36 0.12 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Fixed_assets 0.71 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.63 
 (0.67) (0.52) (0.51) (0.52) (0.58) 
Capexp_ta 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Int_cov 8.56 12.50 14.67 4.48 11.86 
 (6.05) (4.66) (5.01) (2.99) (6.27) 
Subord 0.20 0.30 0.27 0.49 0.18 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Altman 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.24 0.14 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Ivol 9.41 13.88 14.02 14.41 11.78 
 (8.69) (12.43) (12.57) (13.30) (10.33) 
Rating_issuer 15.04 11.79 11.92 10.90 13.95 
 (15) (11) (11) (10) (14) 
Rating_issue 15.05 10.88 11.46 9.95 14.51 
 (15) (10) (11) (8.5) (14) 
Missing_rating 0.03 0.34 0.37 0.09 0.54 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) 
Principal 557.38 376.88 428.50 322.83 82.71 
 (300) (200) (218.8) (200) (55) 
Years_m 12.38 6.14 4.79 9.60 9.84 
 (10.14) (5.01) (5.00) (10.13) (8.62) 
Yield_m 4.78 6.54 7.56 6.78 4.99 
 (4.66) (6.27) (7.09) (6.78) (4.91) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the means (medians) of firm and issue characteristics of firms that issue public debt 
(public bonds), private debt (private offerings), and different types of private debt (bank loans, 144A 
issues, and traditional private issues). The sample is formed by 9,478 firm-issues from 1995 to 2003. 
Appendix A contains definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3 
Differences in Firm and Issue Characteristics between Different Debt Offerings 
 
  All Private vs. 
Public 
144A vs. 
Bank Loan 
144A vs. 
Traditional 
Private 
Bank Loan vs. 
Traditional 
Private 
Traditional 
Private vs. 
Public   
Total_assets -10097.26 3888.33 1393.35 -2494.98 -8553.74 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.389) (0.010) (0.004) 
Marketcap -11499.58 1486.32 -756.57 -2242.89 -9738.50 
 (0.000) (0.038) (0.642) (0.012) (0.002) 
Age -9.187 0.011 -3.068 -3.078 -6.396 
 (0.005) (0.983) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024) 
Leverage 0.032 0.132 0.170 0.038 -0.026 
 (0.048) (0.087) (0.089) (0.134) (0.056) 
Q -0.180 -0.137 -0.118 0.019 -0.172 
 (0.089) (0.156) (0.116) (0.785) (0.103) 
ROA -0.026 -0.021 -0.040 -0.019 -0.004 
 (0.033) (0.057) (0.024) (0.066) (0.413) 
Loss 0.138 0.109 0.232 0.123 0.007 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.013) (0.041) (0.778) 
Fixed_assets -0.127 -0.007 -0.060 -0.053 -0.078 
 (0.008) (0.753) (0.051) (0.079) (0.012) 
Capexp_ta -0.006 0.011 0.004 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.079) (0.062) (0.555) (0.245) (0.906) 
Int_cov 3.950 -10.194 -7.384 2.810 3.309 
 (0.037) (0.064) (0.234) (0.070) (0.189) 
Subord 0.106 0.224 0.310 0.086 -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.024) (0.049) (0.688) 
Altman 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.097) (0.078) (0.065) (0.843) (0.198) 
Ivol 4.472 0.394 2.627 2.233 2.377 
 (0.003) (0.059) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) 
Rating_issuer -3.248 -1.017 -3.044 -2.027 -1.092 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.035) 
Rating_issue -4.165 -1.507 -2.457 -3.057 -0.534 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.148) 
Missing_rating 0.31 -0.28 -0.45 -0.17 0.51 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Principal -180.50 -105.67 240.12 345.79 -474.67 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years_m -6.244 4.807 -0.241 -5.048 -2.541 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.568) (0.005) (0.023) 
Yield_m 1.761 -0.784 1.790 2.256 0.214 
 (0.000) (0.049) (0.008) (0.008) (0.078) 
This table presents the difference of the means of firm and issue characteristics for firms that issue public debt 
(private bonds), private debt (private offerings), and different types of private debt (bank loans, 144A issues, and 
traditional private issues). The sample is formed by 9,478 firm-issues from 1995 to 2003. The p-values are obtained 
with an unbalanced mixed model of variance with random firm and year effects to control for dependency among 
different debt groups. Appendix A contains definitions of all variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
Significance at a minimum of 10% is reported in bold. 
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Table 4 
Difference between issue and issuer ratings – Univariate analysis 
 
     
Security Mean St Dev t-stat p-value N 
Public 0.22 1.98 4.73 <0.001 1836 
Loan 0.16 1.33 4.50 <0.001 1429 
144A -0.95 2.30 -12.95 <0.001 1313 
Traditional Private 0.24 1.73 1.26 0.212 84 
 
This table presents pair t-tests between issue and issuer ratings by issue type (public bonds, bank loans, 
144A debt placements, and traditional private placements). I obtain the numerical rating by using the 
conversion scheme presented in Appendix B and averaging Moody’s and S&P ratings for companies 
covered by both rating agencies. Significance at a minimum of 10% is reported in bold. 
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Table 5 
Two-Step Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Sources of Debt 
 
Panel A: OLS regression to calculate rating residuals (Rating_res) 
 
  Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.038 0.919 
Lnassets 0.276 0.000 
Lnmarketcap 0.690 0.000 
Lnage 0.289 0.000 
Leverage -1.252 0.000 
ROA 1.626 0.000 
Q 0.380 0.000 
Loss -0.556 0.000 
Int_cov 0.001 0.212 
Subord -0.626 0.000 
Fixed_assets 0.288 0.000 
Capexp_ta -0.891 0.014 
Ivol -0.126 0.000 
Altman -0.710 0.000 
   
Adjusted R2 0.701   
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Panel B: Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 
  pub_vs_144a loan_vs_144a priv_vs_144a pub_vs_loan priv_vs_loan pub_vs_priv 
Intercept -2.007 4.542 -1.740 -6.536 -6.244 -0.060 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.939) 
Lnassets 0.273 -0.478 0.421 0.896 0.748 0.166 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Principal 0.001 0.001 -0.014 0.001 -0.015 0.015 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q 0.135 0.062 -0.004 0.074 -0.065 0.120 
 (0.017) (0.198) (0.961) (0.074) (0.276) (0.063) 
Altman -0.556 -0.329 -0.457 -0.224 -0.128 -0.059 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.017) (0.045) (0.475) (0.762) 
Fixed_assets 0.718 0.596 0.324 0.125 -0.269 0.409 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.239) (0.094) (0.02) 
Capexp_ta 0.248 -2.358 -0.898 2.585 1.432 1.199 
 (0.646) (0.000) (0.214) (0.000) (0.033) (0.118) 
Int_cov 0.000 0.010 0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.998) (0.026) (0.471) (0.002) (0.009) (0.388) 
Ivol -0.119 -0.018 -0.050 -0.100 -0.032 -0.068 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.573 -1.909 -0.908 1.335 1.001 0.114 
 (0.040) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.006) (0.777) 
Lnage 0.145 0.069 0.063 0.076 -0.009 0.078 
 (0.003) (0.071) (0.335) (0.056) (0.879) (0.229) 
Loss -0.279 -0.017 -0.376 -0.253 -0.355 0.033 
 (0.039) (0.867) (0.055) (0.033) (0.048) (0.869) 
ROA 0.271 -0.713 -0.268 0.972 0.429 0.414 
 (0.68) (0.103) (0.748) (0.116) (0.577) (0.656) 
Subord -0.692 -0.386 -0.485 -0.306 -0.104 -0.168 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.475) (0.291) 
Rating_res 0.255 0.102 0.044 0.153 -0.057 0.224 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.298) (0.000) (0.148) (0.000) 
Missing_rating -0.630 1.810 3.208 -2.439 1.398 -3.836 
  (0.128) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.38      
 
Panel A presents the results of an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is Rating_issuer, the 
numerical credit rating obtained by using the conversion scheme presented in Appendix B and averaging 
issuer ratings offered by Moody’s and S&P. Panel B presents the results of six multinomial logistic 
regressions with firm and year random effects in which the dependent variables are the log-odds ratio of 
the probability of issuing (1) public bonds versus 144A issues, (2)  bank loans versus 144A issues, (3) 
traditional private debt versus 144A issues, (4) public bonds versus bank loans, (5) traditional private debt 
versus banks loans, and (6) public bonds versus traditional private placements. Rating_res are the 
residuals of the OLS presented in Panel A. Appendix A contains definitions of all other variables. P-
values are reported in parenthesis. Significance at a minimum of 10% is reported in bold. 
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Table 6 
Economic Significance of the Multinomial Logit Coefficients 
 
 
 
 Public Loan Traditional private 144A 
Lnassets 20.60 -34.30 4.00 9.70 
Principal 0.60 15.00 -10.70 -5.00 
Q 1.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.90 
Altman -5.00 -0.50 -0.40 5.80 
Fixed_assets 2.40 3.60 -0.20 -5.70 
Capexp_ta 2.00 -3.80 0.10 1.70 
Int_cov -0.70 1.50 0.00 -0.70 
Ivol -12.00 7.00 -0.40 5.30 
Leverage 3.10 -10.20 0.20 6.90 
Lnage 2.30 0.30 -0.10 -2.50 
Loss -3.50 2.40 -0.60 1.80 
ROA 0.60 -1.10 0.00 0.50 
Subord -5.60 -2.90 -0.30 8.80 
Rating_res 6.80 -0.80 -0.40 -5.60 
Missing_rating -16.40 21.60 11.40 -16.60 
 
  
This table presents changes in probability of issuing public bonds, bank loans, 144A issues, and 
traditional private debt implied by the multinomial logit presented in Panel B of Table 5. The change in 
probability is calculated by assuming that the value of each variable increases from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile (or from zero to one for indicator variables) while all the other variables retain their median 
values. Rating_res are the residuals of the OLS regression presented in Panel A of Table 5. Appendix A 
contains definitions of all other variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 7 
Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Sources of Debt when 144A Debt Issuers and 
Traditional Private Issuers are Considered Jointly 
 
  public_vs_allpriv   loan_vs_allpriv   public_vs_loan 
Intercept -4.364  1.276  -5.640 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Lnassets 0.278  -0.622  0.910 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Principal 0.007  0.004  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Q 0.185  0.051  0.135 
 (0.000)  (0.127)  (0.000) 
Altman -0.434  -0.224  -0.211 
 (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.097) 
Fixed_assets 0.575  0.245  0.331 
 (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Capexp_ta 0.053  -1.897  1.951 
 (0.906)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Int_cov -0.001  0.003  -0.004 
 (0.227)  (0.039)  (0.004) 
Ivol -0.103  -0.023  -0.08 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
Leverage -0.718  -1.885  1.169 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Lnage 0.099  0.056  0.043 
 (0.006)  (0.082)  (0.061) 
Loss -0.550  -0.012  -0.538 
 (0.000)  (0.881)  (0.000) 
ROA 0.002  -0.853  0.855 
 (0.994)  (0.143)  (0.137) 
Subord -0.656  -0.371  -0.286 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rating_res 0.280  0.085  0.195 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Missing_rating -2.002  0.342  -2.344 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.25     
 
This table presents the results of three multinomial logistic regressions with firm and year random effects 
in which the dependent variables are the log-odds ratio of the probability of issuing (1) public bonds 
versus non-bank private debt issues, (2) bank loans versus non-bank private debt issues, and (3) public 
bonds versus bank loans. Rating_res are the residuals of the OLS presented in Panel A of Table 5. 
Appendix A contains definitions of all other variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis. Significance 
at a minimum of 10% is reported in bold.  
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Table 8 
Characteristics of traditional private issuers before and after 1990 
 
    1981-1989 1991-2003 t-stat p-value 
Lnassets  7.37 8.00 11.99 0.000 
Q  1.26 1.50 9.97 0.000 
Altman  0.67 0.62 -4.18 0.000 
Fixed_assets  0.75 0.66 -8.49 0.000 
Int_cov  6.33 9.37 3.78 0.000 
Leverage  0.39 0.37 -2.88 0.004 
Loss  0.16 0.12 -4.35 0.000 
ROA  0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.958 
Subord  0.33 0.23 -8.18 0.000 
Rating   14.42 15.98 6.60 0.000 
        chi-square p-value 
% speculative-grade issuers 61.16% 43.36% 211.55 0.000 
Average n. issues per year    428 287      
 
This table presents two samples t-tests and a chi-square test for firm characteristics related to credit 
quality of firms which issued traditional private debt before and after 1990. Appendix A contains 
definitions of all the variables. 
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Table 9 
Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Sources of Debt with Investment-Grade Rating 
Indicator Variable 
 
 
  pub_vs_144a loan_vs_144a priv_vs_144a pub_vs_loan priv_vs_loan pub_vs_priv 
Intercept -2.750 2.477 -0.344 -4.875 -2.313 -2.578 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lnassets 0.223 -0.552 0.478 0.752 0.548 0.208 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Principal 0.001 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.016 0.016 
 (0.000) (0.098) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0000) 
Q 0.094 0.006 -0.072 0.096 0.002 0.095 
 (0.048) (0.886) (0.279) (0.006) (0.971) (0.046) 
Altman -0.325 -0.220 -0.413 -0.142 0.082 -0.028 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.023) (0.085) (0.336) (0.648) 
Fixed_assets 0.516 0.312 0.444 0.184 -0.325 0.511 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.153) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capexp_ta -0.060 -2.211 -1.533 2.281 2.248 0.007 
 (0.897) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.987) 
Int_cov 0.000 0.006 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 0.000 
 (0.932) (0.035) (0.451) (0.021) (0.047) (0.968) 
Ivol -0.113 -0.019 -0.041 -0.122 -0.037 -0.071 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.242 -1.705 -0.234 1.507 1.658 -0.147 
 (0.087) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000) (0.000) (0.538) 
Lnage 0.135 0.061 0.063 0.067 -0.004 0.072 
 (0.004) (0.077) (0.335) (0.059) (0.911) (0.256) 
Loss -0.314 -0.026 -0.396 -0.261 -0.214 -0.091 
 (0.005) (0.756) (0.000) (0.012) (0.082) (0.210) 
ROA -0.053 -0.990 -0.289 0.765 0.808 -0.049 
 (0.847) (0.102) (0.463) (0.137) (0.212) (0.856) 
Subord -0.419 -0.314 -0.538 -0.197 0.123 -0.221 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.342) (0.208) 
Rating_dummy 1.910 0.755 0.909 1.182 -0.141 1.913 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.189) (0.000) 
Missing_rating -0.259 1.569 3.080 -1.937 1.635 -3.512 
  (0.254) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.29      
 
 
This table presents the results of six multinomial logistic regressions with firm and year random effects in 
which the dependent variables are the log-odds ratio of the probability of issuing (1) public bonds versus 
144A issues, (2) bank loans versus 144A issues, (3) traditional private debt versus 144A issues, (4) public 
bonds versus bank loans, (5) traditional private debt versus banks loans, and (6) public bonds versus 
traditional private placements. Appendix A contains definitions of all other variables. P-values are 
reported in parenthesis. Significance at a minimum of 10% is reported in bold. 
 
